

Message Text

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ORIGIN PM-09

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 EA-11 ADP-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-02

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-15

USIA-12 NEA-10 GAC-01 TRSE-00 MBFR-03 SAJ-01 ACDA-19

AEC-11 IO-12 OMB-01 /161 R

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APPROVED BY D: MR. RUSH

EUR/ RPM - MR. STREATOR (DRAFT)

PM - MR. SPIERS (DRAFT)

EA - MR. SNEIDER (DRAFT)

PM/ DCA - MR. TIMBERMAN (DRAFT)

S/ S - MR. MILLER

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R 190317 Z MAY 73

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

CINCPAC

S E C R E T STATE 096595

E. O. 11652: GDS, DECLAS 12/31/81

TAGS: JA, PARM

SUBJ: DISCUSSION WITH THE JAPANESE ON MBFR AND EUROPEAN
SECURITY ISSUES

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR; HELSINKI FOR CSCE

1. ACTING SECRETARY RUSH MET WITH AMBASSADOR USHIBA
MAY 17 AT LATTER' S REQUEST TO DISCUSS MBFR/ CSCE AND US
ATLANTIC CHARTER PROPOSAL. ACTING SECRETARY DESCRIBED US
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MBFR POSITION RECENTLY SUBMITTED NATO IN GENERAL TERMS AND GAVE JAPANESE PAPER SUMMARIZING THE THREE US- PROPOSED REDUC-TION OPTIONS. JAPANESE QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS STRESSED DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EUROPE AND ASIA AND REFLECTED JAPANESE CONCERN ABOUT AN ASIAN CSCE/ MBFR. AM0 ASSADOR ALSO COMMENTED ON THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF CSCE/ MBFR ON THE USSR, CHINA, AND THE US AND VARIOUS ASIAN COUNTRIES. AS TO JAPANESE VIEWS HE STATED THAT THEY HOPED MBFR/ CSCE WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL IN REDUCING TENSIONS BUT HOPED THAT THEY WOULD NOT SET PRECEDENTS FOR SIMILAR CONFERENCES RE ASIA. THEY ALSO STRESSED IMPORTANT MBFR NOT UNDERMINE WESTERN SECURITY AND THEREFORE SUPPORTED CONCEPT OF BALANCE. ACTING SECRETARY REPLIED THAT HE DOUBTED MBFR/ CSCE WOULD HAVE SPECIFIC IMPACT ON ASIA EXCEPT INsofar AS DIMINUTION OF EAST- WEST TENSIONS, IN VIEW GLOBAL NATURE OF US- USSR RELATIONS WOULD BE OF GENERAL BENEFIT.

2. AT CONCLUSION OF SESSION, USHIBA ASKED ABOUT THE ATLANTIC CHARTER AND INDICATED THEY WERE STUDYING IT WITH INTEREST AND WANTED TO CONTRIBUTE TO ITS SUCCESS. HE STATED JAPAN WANTED TO SUBSCRIBE TO AGREEMENT BUT FEARED BEING ASKED TO SIGN US- EUROPEAN DOCUMENTS. HE EXPECTED IT TO BE MAJOR THEME OF PM VISIT IN JULY. JAPANESE ASSUMED THAT US WISHED TO FORMULATE AND REACH AGREEMENT ON SPECIFIC DOCUMENT PRIOR TO PRESIDENT' S TRIP TO EUROPE. ACTING SECRETARY STRESSED THAT WE SAW THIS AS BEGINNING OF A CONSULTATIVE PROCESS TO FORMULATE SET OF POSITIVE GOALS TO THE DEVELOPED NATIONS AND WERE NOT FIXED TO ANY GIVEN TIME SCHEDULE.

3. MAIN POINTS MADE BY JAPANESE ON MBFR/ CSCE WERE AS FOLLOWS:

A. WHILE JAPANESE NOT CONCERNED THAT MBFR LIKELY TO INCREASE SOVIET THREAT TO THEM THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT RUSSIANS MIGHT USE PRINCIPLE OF INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS TO SUPPORT THEIR CLAIM TO JAPAN' S NORTHERN TERRITORIES.

B. JAPANESE VERY INTERESTED IN CSCE ITEM ON HUMAN CONTACTS AND HOPE WEST WILL MAKE " UTMOST EFFORT" ON THIS POINT.

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C. THEY ARE UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT IDEA OF PERMANENT CSCE BODY WHICH THEY BELIEVE COULD HAVE ADVERSE AFFECT IN ASIA BY SETTING PRECEDENT FOR SOVIET EFFORT TO ESTABLISH SIMILAR BODY IN ASIA, WHICH JAPAN WOULD OPPOSE.

D. IT IS LIKELY THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL INCREASE

PUBLIC FEELING OF DETENTE IN JAPAN AND COULD LEAD TO GROW-
ING CRITICISM OF US/ JAPANESE SECURITY TREATY.

4. AMBASSADOR SPECULATED THAT MBFR MIGHT INCREASE PRES-
SURES FOR SMALL NATIONS OF EUROPE TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES
AND THUS LOWER NUCLEAR THRESHOLD. ON OTHER HAND IF ONLY
US REDUCED EUROPEANS WOULD HAVE LARGER VEIGHT IN NATO AND
THUS MIGHT WANT GREATER VOICE IN NUCLEAR STRATEGY. ACT-
ING SECRETARY STRESSED THAT US FAVORED STATIONED FORCE

REDUCTIONS BECAUSE INDIGENOUS FORCE REDUCTIONS INVOLVED
REAL DISARMAMENT WHILE REDUCTIONS IN STATIONED FORCES IN-
VOLVED ONLY REDEPLOYMENT. HE SAID EUROPEANS ALREADY HAVE
LARGE VOICE IN STRATEGY.

5. MORE DETAILED MEMCON AND TALKING POINTS USED BY
JAPANESE BEING POUCHED. US PAPER SUMMARIZING MBFR OP-
TIONS, WHICH WE STRESSED TO JAPANESE WAS HIGHLY SENSITIVE,
BEING POUCHED TOKYO FOR INFORMATION. RUSH

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